Believing the Impossible by Brown, Curtis
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Philosophy Faculty Research Philosophy Department 
1991 
Believing the Impossible 
Curtis Brown 
Trinity University, cbrown@trinity.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/phil_faculty 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Brown, C. (1991). Believing the impossible. Synthese, 89(3), 353-364. doi:10.1007/BF00413502 
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at Digital Commons @ 
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
(This paper appeared in Synthese 89 (1991): 353-364. There may be small 
differences between this version and the published one.) 
BELIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE 
Curtis Brown 
            Ruth Barcan Marcus has argued that, just as we cannot know what is 
false, we cannot believe what is impossible.1 I will offer an interpretation of 
her defense of this view. I will then argue, first, that if the defense succeeded it 
would also justify rejecting many, perhaps most, of our ordinary belief 
ascriptions; and second, that, luckily, the defense does not succeed. Finally, I 
suggest that despite its failure there is something correct and important in 
Marcus's argument. 
            A prefatory note: I will speak of the objects of belief as "propositions." 
Marcus disapproves of this terminology, taking it to suggest that the objects of 
belief are linguistic or quasi-linguistic. Her preferred view is that the objects of 
belief are states of affairs, where these might be considered to be something 
like sequences of actual objects and properties. But I intend to use the term 
'proposition' not for sentences but for whatever semantic entities are expressed 
by sentences on particular occasions of use; on this usage, states of affairs 
provide one among various possible explications of the nature of propositions. 
This use of the term "proposition" is fairly widespread, especially in recent 
writing (as Marcus herself notes: see 325, note 5). 
            To consider Marcus's defense, we need to remind ourselves of Kripke's 
well-known puzzle about Pierre's beliefs. Pierre, a native French speaker, 
assents, on good grounds, to the French sentence 'Londres est jolie'. Later he 
moves to England, learns English directly, without translation into French, and 
comes to assent to the English sentence 'London is not pretty'. He does not 
know that 'Londres' and 'London' refer to the same city. It seems that we have 
good reason to attribute to him both the belief that London is pretty (because of 
his assent to the French sentence) and the belief that London is not pretty 
(because of his assent to the English sentence). 
            In support of her view that we cannot believe the impossible, Marcus 
defends the intuition that one should give up the claim to believe something on 
learning that it could not possibly be true. For example, Pierre might 
well say "London is different from Londres." But, Marcus says, "in cases like 
Pierre's, once an impossibility had been disclosed, I would say that I had 
only claimed to believe that London was different from Londres. For that 
would be tantamount to believing that something was not the same as itself, and 
surely I could never believe that" (330).2 
            In the course of defending her intuition, Marcus makes some important 
points. In particular, she argues, first, that linguistic acts like assent and dissent 
are only some among many indicators of belief, completely absent in some 
believers (dogs, for example) and not decisive even for those of us who do have 
language. As a result there is a difference between assenting to a sentence and 
believing the proposition it expresses. Second, she argues against a narrowly 
linguistic conception of rationality, one which pertains only to one's facility at 
manipulating sentences according to logical rules. Instead, "wewill say that an 
agent is perfectly rational if all the behavioral indicators of belief are 'coherent' 
with one another" (334). 
            I believe both these points to be correct and important. They provide 
common ground by reference to which we may evaluate the considerations 
she marshalls in favor of her intuition that we cannot believe the impossible. 
How does Marcus defend this intuition? I will quote a crucial passage and then 
explain what argument I take the passage to be suggesting. Marcus writes, of 
the supposition that one can only believe what is possible: 
How otherwise is one to distinguish Pierre's other behavior, such 
as his "choice" behavior, from that of a wholly irrational agent? 
A wholly irrational agent is not merely logically irrational . . . he 
is an agent for whom linguistic and nonlinguistic belief indicators 
are incoherent. There is a question here whether, with widely 
incoherent belief indicators, he has beliefs at all. For what work 
could "belief" be employed in such a case? . . . [Marcus asks us to 
assume that Pierre is rational in the broad sense. Even so, she 
says] some of his behavior, and some of the intended outcomes of 
his purported beliefs about London, would be just like those of an 
irrational agent. If, for example, Pierre, in accordance with his 
assents, were to bet on a given occasion onLondres being pretty 
and London being not pretty, the outcome of his bet would be as 
self-vitiating as that of the wholly irrational agent. Yet 
purely logical considerations and the empirical justification 
available to him made that bet wholly "reasonable" (336-337). 
            Let us begin to explicate this by elaborating a bit on Marcus's wager 
example. We imagine a psychological experiment with two subjects, Pierre and 
his irrational counterpart Ira. Ira's history is much like Pierre's (born in France, 
moved to England, learned English without translation, and so on), but Ira, 
unlike Pierre, believes that 'Londres' and 'London' are coreferential. Each of the 
subjects is given a sheet of paper containing four sentences, and asked to check 
one of them. Each is told that he will be paid $10 if the sentence he checks is 
true and charged $10 otherwise. The sentences are: 
Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. 
Londres is not pretty and London is pretty. 
Londres is not pretty and London is not pretty. 
Londres is pretty and London is pretty. 
Confronted with the sheet of paper, let us suppose, Pierre and Ira both check 
the first sentence. Pierre checks it because he assents to the sentence, and he 
assents to the sentence for the Kripkean reasons already discussed. Why does 
Ira check the first sentence? He believes that 'Londres' and 'London' 
are coreferential, and so realizes that the sentence is contradictory: he either 
accepts the contradictory sentence anyway, or else bets on the truth of a 
sentence he does not accept. Either way his behavior seems clearly irrational. I 
take Marcus to be asserting that we can correctly distinguish Pierre's behavior 
and the reasons for it from Ira's genuinely irrational behavior only by rejecting 
the idea that Pierre believes the impossible. 
            If this is indeed Marcus's strategy, then she needs to show two things: 
first, that if we reject the idea that Pierre believes the impossible, we can 
explain his actions (but not Ira's) in a way that reveals their rationality; second, 
that if we do not reject the idea that Pierre believes the impossible, 
we cannot explain his actions in a way that reveals their rationality, that is, in a 
way that distinguishes them from Ira's. Consider the first point: suppose that 
Pierre does not believe anything impossible, although he assents to a sentence 
which, unknown to him, expresses an impossible proposition. Then we can 
explain his behavior in a way which exhibits its rationality: he wants to receive 
$10, he believes that if he places a check mark by a true sentence he will 
receive $10, and he believes that of the sentences before him the first and only 
the first is true. So, quite reasonably, he engages in the behavior of placing a 
check by the first sentence. No such explanation is available for Ira, who knows 
the sentence is contradictory, knows it cannot possibly be true, but checks it 
anyway, either because he believes things he knows cannot be true or because 
he gambles on the truth of statements he believes to be false. 
            So far our results support what I am taking to be Marcus's argument. If 
we do not assume Pierre believes the impossible, we can explain why his 
behavior is rational while Ira's identical behavior is not. Now consider the 
second point: suppose that Pierre does believe the impossible, that 
he does believe that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. It seems that 
there is no explanation of the rationality of Pierre's action which appeals to his 
believing that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty. If we try to explain 
his bet by saying "he bet on the impossible proposition because he believed it," 
this makes him sound irrational--quite as irrational, in fact, as Ira. This, I take 
it, is why Marcus claims that if we attribute to Pierre a belief in the impossible 
we will not be able to distinguish his behavior "from that of a wholly irrational 
agent." (But how does adding the impossible proposition in question to the 
things we take Pierre to believe invalidate the explanation I have already 
offered of the difference between Pierre and Ira? Pierre still has the beliefs that 
explanation made use of, and they still rationalize his behavior. I will return to 
this point.) 
            My response to this argument is twofold. I will argue, first, that the very 
same sort of argument would justify denying far more of Pierre's beliefs than 
just his beliefs in the impossible. In fact it would justify rejecting many, 
perhaps most, of our ordinary belief ascriptions. But I will also argue, second, 
that we can explain the difference between Pierre and Ira without denying that 
Pierre believes the impossible. 
            First: Marcus's argument, if successful, shows far more than she wants 
it to. While Marcus denies that Pierre believes the impossible, she accepts that 
he has incompatible beliefs: he believes thatLondres is pretty, that is, he 
believes that London is pretty; and he also believes that London is not pretty.3 
And this is enough to produce the same sort of difficulties she finds 
unacceptable in the case of belief in the impossible. Suppose that instead of 
being asked to check one of the four sentences listed earlier, Pierre and Ira are 
asked to check as few or as many sentences as they like from the following list, 
and told that they will be paid for every truth they check and charged for every 
falsehood. The list consists of: 
            London is pretty. 
London is not pretty. 
Londres is pretty. 
Londres is not pretty. 
Pierre and Ira both check the second and third sentences, thus guaranteeing that 
they will win nothing. Shall we say that Pierre checks the second box because 
he believes that London is not pretty, and checks the third box because he 
believes London is pretty? If so, how is this different from our explanation of 
Ira's choice? Surely any explanation of Pierre's behavior that accounts for its 
rationality will need to appeal to the fact that he thinks both his choices can be 
true together. Shall we say that Pierre believes these incompatible propositions 
to be compatible? That seems to exacerbate rather than eliminate his apparent 
irrationality. And if it did succeed in exhibiting the rationality of Pierre's 
actions, then Marcus could also exhibit his rationality in the first gambling case 
by saying that Pierre there believed an impossible proposition to be possible. 
Here, as before, if we want to exhibit the rationality of Pierre's behavior, we do 
best to retreat to his attitudes toward sentences, pointing out that he believes the 
second and third sentences are true and that he also believes these two 
sentences are compatible. It is precisely this inability to explain Pierre's 
reasonableness in terms of his beliefs about London that Marcus uses as 
justification for denying that he believes the impossible, so the case that Pierre 
also does not believe individually that London is pretty or not pretty seems 
equally strong. 
            There are also less artificial examples of Pierre's apparent irrationality. 
On Marcus's account, Pierre believes that London is pretty (in virtue of 
accepting 'Londres est jolie'). Why then does he refuse to assent to 'London is 
pretty', a sentence he understands and which expresses a proposition he 
believes? Why does he mutter "ugh" under his breath whenever he goes for a 
walk in London? These seem like precisely the sorts of apparent incoherence 
among belief indicators which Marcus hopes to avoid by rejecting belief in the 
impossible. And here once again, to explain why Pierre is rational while Ira is 
not, we will need to withdraw from the level of belief in the proposition that 
London is pretty to the level of beliefs about sentences like 'Londres est jolie'. 
Again, Marcus has as good a justification for rejecting Pierre's beliefs that 
London is pretty and that London is not pretty as she does for rejecting his 
belief that London is pretty and London is not pretty. 
            We have seen that Marcus’s argument, if successful, would require us 
to deny not only that one can believe the impossible, but also, contrary to her 
intention, that one cannot have incompatible beliefs. But the skeptical 
consequences of Marcus’s argument do not end there. If Marcus were to deny 
the possibility of incompatible beliefs, as I have argued she must, she would 
also have to deny the possibility of beliefs with which one would come to 
believe something incompatible. 
            Why does she need to claim this? Consider the point at which we would 
ordinarily say that Pierre acquired the belief that London is not pretty. If it’s 
impossible to have incompatible beliefs, then we must deny either that he really 
believes that London is pretty, or that he believes that London is not pretty, or 
both. Since the credentials of these two beliefs are equally good, for instance, in 
the case of Pierre, we will need to deny that Pierre believes either. So either he 
suddenly loses the belief that London is pretty or he never had it. But it can’t be 
that he suddenly lost it, since he has not undergone any of the changes by 
which one loses a belief, such as forgetting it or changing one’s mind. So he 
must never have had it. 
            Now consider the time at which it seemed (falsely, as it turns out) that 
Pierre acquired the belief that London is pretty. Either the fact that he doesn’t 
believe that London is pretty depends on something that hasn’t happened yet, 
namely his later apparent acquisition of the belief that London is not pretty, or 
it does not. But surely what one now believes cannot depend on something that 
has not yet happened, and will not happen for months or years. If this is correct, 
then we need a principle which, depending only on facts up to now, will rule 
out an agent’s every believing things with which belief the agent later adds are 
incompatible. But the only principle which is guaranteed to accomplish this is 
the principle that one can’t have any belief with which one could later come to 
believe something incompatible. But this in turn will lead to a wholesale 
rejection of almost any beliefs in singular propositions and also most beliefs we 
have in virtue of believing to be true sentences containing proper names, kind 
terms, mathematical expressions, and so on. 
            Supposing I have understood Marcus's argument correctly, then, it has 
much more wide-ranging and sceptical consequences than she acknowledges or 
intends--consequences so wide-ranging andsceptical that we might regard them 
as a reductio of her argument that we cannot believe the impossible. But then 
what of the problem of distinguishing Pierre's behavior from Ira's? Is there after 
all no difference, or at least no way to explain the difference? 
            I maintain that precisely the same explanation of Pierre's behavior is 
possible whether or not we deny that he has incompatible beliefs, and whether 
or not we deny that he believes the impossible. We do not need to deny that 
Pierre believes that London is pretty to explain the rationality of, for example, 
his refusal to assent to 'London is pretty'. Rather, we need to keep track of the 
deeper beliefs in virtue of which he believes that London is pretty. Pierre 
believes that the sentence 'Londres est jolie', of which he is a competent user, is 
true. It is in virtue of believing this (together with various further beliefs, for 
example about the meaning of the sentence, and together with various facts 
about his circumstances, such as the fact that 'Londres' refers to London) that 
he believes that London is pretty: if he did not believe that the French sentence 
were true, then our grounds for attributing to him the belief that London is 
pretty would disappear. To explain his rationality, we need to focus not on his 
beliefs about London, but on the belief in the truth of the French sentence 
which grounds one of his beliefs about London. But this does not require 
rejecting the belief about London. 
            For similar reasons, we do not need to deny that Pierre believes 
that Londres is pretty and London is not pretty in order to explain the difference 
between his behavior and Ira's on our first gambling experiment. To exhibit 
Pierre's rationality we need, not to deny his belief in the impossible, but to 
appeal to the way he believes it, to the deeper beliefs in virtue of which he 
believes it--in particular, in this case, the belief that 'Londres est jolie' is 
true and 'London is pretty' is true. This deeper belief could be true. So Pierre, 
unlike Ira, believes something impossible in virtue of believing something 
possible; his behavior can be seen to be reasonable in light of this deeper, 
possible, belief. Ordinarily we can make use of people's indirect beliefs in 
explaining their behavior without getting into difficulty, but when, as with 
Pierre, puzzles arise, we need to look deeper, at the less indirect beliefs in 
virtue of which we believe our more indirect ones. 
            There is a simple argument from two premisses to a conclusion which is 
useful in thinking about the issues Marcus raises. I suspect that something like 
this argument underlies her thinking. It goes like this: 
(1) The objects of one's belief characterize one's mental state, and 
(2) Impossibilities could not usefully characterize a rational 
person's state of mind; so 
(3) A rational person cannot believe the impossible. 
(Marcus suggests a less qualified conclusion, but her case is strongest as 
applied to rational individuals.) 
            Consider the two premisses of our argument, beginning with (1). 
"Mental state" is to be taken to be one's narrow or intrinsic mental state, the 
sort of mental state that cannot change unless something inside the person 
changes. Conceivably this is a Cartesian chimera, but it is surely the ordinary 
notion of a mental state. And the claim that the objects of one's belief 
characterize one's mental state is to be taken in a very strong sense: the things 
one believes could not be different unless one's mental state were different, and 
one's belief state could not be different unless the objects of one's belief were 
different.4 
            This is a strong interpretation of what it takes to characterize one's 
mental state, but it is the interpretation we need to make (2), to which we now 
turn, plausible. There are two reasons for the plausibility of the claim that 
impossibilities cannot usefully characterize a rational person's state of mind: 
one appeals to belief alone, the other to the relation between belief and action. 
The first reason is that the most basic rule concerning the rationality of belief is 
something like "don't believe what cannot possibly be true," so it is very hard 
indeed to see how an impossibility could characterize the mental state of a 
rational person.5 If objects of belief characterize one's mental state, we ought to 
be able to appeal to these objects of belief in exhibiting or explaining one's 
rationality, and for this purpose impossibilities simply will not serve. 
            The second reason for the plausibility of (2) concerns the relation 
between belief and action, and is suggested by Marcus's discussion of these 
matters. Belief is tied closely to action: we need to be able to explain one's 
actions in terms of one's beliefs and desires, and to make inferences about one's 
beliefs on the evidence provided by one's behavior. And the notion of 
rationality is deeply involved in both projects. If an individual is rational, then 
the beliefs that explain the individual's actions should also make them 
reasonable, and conversely the beliefs we may infer from one's actions are 
precisely those in terms of which the actions make most sense. 
            What, then, of impossibilities? What actions do they make reasonable? 
What behavior do they predict or explain? Take Pierre, for instance. He 
believes that London is pretty and that London is not pretty. What then will he 
do? Go to London? Try to stay away? Either action seems irrational given his 
beliefs, so neither can be predicted; if he performs either, his beliefs do not 
explain why. Each conjunct of the sentence I have used to describe his belief 
destroys the predictions or explanations that might have been made on the basis 
of the other conjunct,6 so that Pierre's belief as a whole seems to offer us no 
insight into his behavior. And it is just as unclear how one could infer belief in 
an impossibility from one's behavior. If one's behavior utterly stopped making 
sense, then perhaps we would have grounds for ascribing to that person belief 
in impossibilities if we had grounds for ascribing any beliefs at all. But Pierre's 
behavior is completely rational, so we need to ascribe beliefs according to 
which it makes sense; ascribing beliefs in the impossible will not accomplish 
this. 
            We have seen why the second premise in our little argument seems so 
plausible. Supposing it is correct, we have two choices, neither of which seems 
attractive. One possibility, the one Marcus adopts, is to reject the view that we 
can believe the impossible, that is, to accept (3). I have argued that the only 
grounds on which this can be justified will lead to a wholesale rejection of our 
ordinary ascriptions of belief. We can now see why from a slightly broader 
perspective. The motivation for rejecting belief in the impossible is that it fails 
to exhibit one's rationality. But almost any indirect belief at least runs the risk 
of this sort of failure. If we are to ascribe only those objects of belief essential 
to making sense of one's thoughts and actions, we will need to abandon far too 
much of our ordinary practice of belief ascription. 
            The second possibility is to reject premise (1), to reject the idea that 
objects of belief characterize our narrow mental states in the strong sense. This 
is the course suggested by much recent writing on belief.7 And it seems to me 
that this is the course we must take. Admitting the existence of indirect belief is 
tantamount to rejecting (1), and the evidence for indirect belief is 
overwhelming. But there are reasons for (1) that we need to find a way to 
preserve, and one of the virtues of Marcus's piece is to call our attention to 
these reasons. I suggest that while (1) is not true of belief in general, there is a 
subclass of our beliefs of which it is true, and of which, therefore, the thesis 
that we cannot believe the impossible is also true. This is the subclass 
consisting of our direct beliefs. 
            Why should we think there are direct beliefs, beliefs which characterize 
our mental state in the sense of (1)? We may offer two reasons parallel to the 
two reasons provided for (2). First, consider the rationality of belief. An 
account of the rationality of belief must be an account of the rationality of what 
is believed, of the objects of belief. If we talk about mental states 
in physicalistic terms, or even in syntactic terms, we simply lose our grip on the 
notion of rationality.8 Possibly we will ultimately be able to say that some 
patterns of neuron firings are irrational, but if so this will be only because we 
have correlated these patterns with certain belief contents, which we know on 
other grounds are irrational. And even at the syntactic level, if it makes sense to 
speak of sentences in the head, it will not make sense to criticize a subject for 
having, say, the sentences S and not S in the subject's "belief-box" unless we 
know that the syntactically identified mark "not" means negation. Talk about 
the rationality of belief seems to be irreducibly talk about the contents of belief, 
about what is believed. 
            We have seen that indirect beliefs always run the risk of concealing the 
reasonableness of our being in the belief states we are in, of making what is 
rational appear irrational. Since we need to evaluate rationality in terms of the 
contents of belief, but cannot reliably do so with respect to indirect belief, we 
ought to conclude that rationality is best assessed in terms of our direct beliefs. 
And this gives us some reason to think there are direct beliefs. 
            A second, similar, reason concerns the rationality of action. We need to 
be able to evaluate actions as rational or irrational, and to do this we need 
explanations of action that appeal to the contents of our beliefs and desires. It 
may be possible to explain behavior in purely mechanical terms, but we cannot 
judge its reasonableness without appealing to objects of belief. We have seen 
how indirect belief always runs the risk of failing to reveal the reasonableness 
of our actions. If objects of belief are essential, but mediate objects of belief 
will not do, that provides some reason for supposing that there are immediate 
objects of belief. 9 
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